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Abstract
In this article, I aim to further thinking in the broadly ‘new materialist’ field by insisting 
it attends to some ubiquitous assumptions. More specifically, I critically interrogate 
what Sara Ahmed has termed ‘the founding gestures of the “new materialism”’. 
These founding rhetorical gestures revolve around a perceived neglect of the matter of 
materiality in ‘postmodernism’ and ‘poststructuralism’ and are meant to pave the way 
for new materialism’s own conception of matter-in/of-the-world. I argue in this article 
that an engagement with the postmodern critique of language as constitutive, as well 
as the poststructuralist critique of pure self-presence, does not warrant these founding 
gestures to be so uncritically rehearsed. Moreover, I demonstrate that texts which rely 
on these gestures, or at least the ones I discuss in this article, are not only founded on 
a misrepresentation of postmodern and poststructuralist thought, but are also guilty of 
repeating the perceived mistakes of which they are critical, such as upholding the language/
matter dichotomy. I discuss a small selection of texts that make use of those popular 
rhetorical gestures to juxtapose the past that is invoked with a more nuanced reading of 
that past. My contention is that if ‘the founding gestures of the “new materialism”’ are not 
addressed, the complexity of the postmodern and poststructuralist positions continues to be 
obscured, with damaging consequences for the further development of the emerging field of 
new materialism, as well as our understanding of cultural theory’s past.
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I
In this article, I engage with the specifics of what Sara Ahmed refers to as ‘the founding gestures 
of “the new materialism”’.1 With this phrase, Ahmed draws attention to the fact that much new 
materialist rhetoric is founded on a specific understanding of cultural theory’s past as having 
been negligent of the matter of materiality. Moreover, she argues that sentences in which such 
an understanding of the past of cultural theory are articulated ‘are repeated without illustration 
or contextualization’, which, she observes, results in ‘the “routinization” of the gesture of pointing 
towards the anti-biologism or constructionism of others’.2 Ahmed’s critique speaks directly to 
the heart of the matter, namely, that the gesture of pointing to the alleged anti-biologism and 
constructionism of others (and here ‘others’ refers to an unidentified group of scholars who, 
importantly, associate with ‘postmodernism’ and ‘poststructuralism’) is rarely elaborated.3 One 
consequence of this lack of engagement is that much new materialist rhetoric appears to rely on 
a misinterpretation, if not misunderstanding, of postmodern and poststructuralist thought. An 
engagement with the postmodern critique of language as constitutive and the poststructuralist 
critique of pure self-presence, I wish to argue in this article, does not warrant such founding 
gestures to be repeated so uncritically. Moreover, an engagement with cultural theory’s past 
renders the situation much more complicated than many who associate with new materialism 
currently suggest. In what follows, then, I discuss a small selection of texts to juxtapose the past 
that is invoked in the repetition of this founding gesture with a more nuanced reading of that past.
At the outset of my discussion, I want to make clear that my critical interrogation does not 
aim to prescribe how to read ‘postmodern’, ‘poststructuralist’ or ‘new materialist’ texts correctly 
(if that is even possible). Nor do I aim to resolve the debate between poststructuralist and new 
materialist approaches to the matter of materiality. I want to emphasise, then, that this article is 
not about choosing sides in this debate. What specifically interests me here is that the founding 
gesture used (recycled, and thus continuously reinforced) by many so-called ‘new materialists’ 
emphatically dismisses postmodernism and poststructuralism for being relativist and anti-realist 
without, as Ahmed so poignantly observes, any illustration or contextualisation. I also want 
to make clear that by homing in on a very specific debate between poststructuralism and new 
materialism—a debate that deals with the status and meaning of language, referentiality and 
representation—I do not wish to reduce the ethico-political concerns of new materialism to this 
debate. Nonetheless, as this debate (in)forms new materialism’s founding gestures, and thus lies 
at the core of this movement, calling attention to its problematic nature is urgent and crucial for 
the further development of new materialism as a politico-philosophical tradition, as well as our 
understanding of cultural theory’s past.
In what follows, by carefully unpacking some claims about postmodernism and 
poststructuralism made in the broadly ‘new materialist’ field, I wish to accentuate the proximity 
and potential usefulness of the former ways of thinking for those who wish to contribute to 
1 Sara Ahmed, ‘Open Forum Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding 
Gestures of the “New Materialism”’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 2008, pp. 23–39. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350506807084854
2 Ibid., p. 25. Nikki Sullivan argues similarly in her critical response to the new materialism. See Nikki 
Sullivan, ‘The Somatechnics of Perception and the Matter of the Non/Human: A Critical Response to the 
New Materialism’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 19, no. 3, 2012, pp. 299–313. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/1350506812443477
3 In an earlier article, I discuss the moralism that underlies these gestures. See Dennis Bruining, ‘A So-
matechnics of Moralism: New Materialism or Material Foundationalism’, Somatechnics, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, 
pp. 149–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/soma.2013.0083
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contemporary debates about materiality.4 To do this, I first turn to the ways in which cultural 
theory’s past with all its shortcomings has been per/conceived in some texts that are associated 
with new materialism. I will do so in a schematic way that highlights some of the most 
commonly articulated criticisms with regard to the alleged neglect of matter and materiality 
in postmodernism, poststructuralism and other associated but crucially not differentiated 
positions, such as the discursive turn and linguistic constructionism. After identifying these 
common threads in the ‘founding gestures of the new materialism’, I suggest how these gestures 
can be nuanced and (re)configured. I then place these gestures within a genealogy of theory(ies) 
of embodiment before offering a brief alternative to the texts discussed in this article.
II
In her contribution to a special issue of the International Journal of Qualitative Studies 
in Education, Maggie MacLure provides a description of what she terms ‘the materialist 
critique of representation’. She writes that ‘many new materialist writers … have been 
especially critical of the “linguistic turn” in post-structural theory, detecting a pervasive 
“representationalism” that has rendered material realities inaccessible behind the linguistic 
or discourse systems that purportedly construct or “represent” them’.5 MacLure’s argument 
revolves around the notion that despite their best efforts, the (again unidentified) scholars 
associated with the ‘linguistic turn’ are still trapped in a dualistic and representationalist 
mindset. Indeed, MacLure’s position is underpinned by the idea that those who associate 
with the linguistic turn and/or poststructuralist theory implicitly argue that material reality 
is buried deep under discourse and language. The editors of the special issue in which 
MacLure’s article appears make a remarkably similar observation. They first write that 
‘authors writing for this special issue make it clear that rethinking humanist ontology is key 
in what comes after humanist qualitative methodology’.6 They then explain what they find 
important about a ‘rethinking [of ] humanist ontology’ by posing the following question: 
‘what would we do at the end of our studies if we academics … really, truly, no longer 
believed in the language/reality binary that presumes a structure of depth—that language 
(secondary) can stand in for the real (primary)’.7 These passages provide a clear example 
of the oft-rehearsed criticisms directed at scholars who associate with postmodernism, 
poststructuralism and the like; namely, notwithstanding their critical interrogations of 
discourse, language and representation, as well as their critique of dichotomous thought, 
these scholars are still believed to adhere to a dualistic representationalism.
The notion of an all-pervasive representationalism in contemporary cultural theory 
functions as a scaffold in one of the most cited texts in debates on matter: Karen Barad’s 
tellingly titled article, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter 
4 Here it is interesting to note that Elizabeth Stephens makes a similar observation, specifically in 
response to Coole and Frost’s anthology New Materialisms. Stephens argues that ‘while Coole and Frost 
define their work and approach in opposition to that of postmodern or poststructuralist theory [a] closer 
examination reveals an interesting point of convergence’. Eizabeth Stephens, ‘Feminism and New Material-
ism: The Matter of Fluidity’, Inter/Alia: A Journal of Queer Studies, vol. 9, 2014, p. 187.
5 Maggie MacLure, ‘Researching without Representation? Language and Materiality in Post-Qualitative 
Methodology’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, vol. 26, no. 6, 2013, p. 659. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2013.788755
6 Patty Lather and Elizabeth A. St Pierre, ‘Post-Qualitative Research’, International Journal of Qualitative 
Studies in Education, vol. 26, no. 6, 2013, p. 629. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09518398.2013.788752
7 Ibid., p. 630.
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Comes to Matter’. Barad opens this now (in)famous piece with the remark that ‘language 
has been granted too much power’, and she continues her lament, ‘the linguistic turn, the 
semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every 
“thing”—even materiality—is turned into a matter of language or some other form of cultural 
representation’.8 Representationalism, according to Barad, departs from the assumption that 
there are ‘two distinct and independent kinds of entities—representations and entities to be 
represented’.9 Yet, despite the fact that representationalism ‘has received significant challenge 
from feminists, poststructuralists, postcolonial critics, and queer theorists’, it is still ‘so deeply 
entrenched within Western culture that it has taken on a commonsense appeal’.10 The 
problem that Barad identifies as inextricably linked to a representationalist way of theorising 
materiality is that in such accounts ‘matter is figured as passive and immutable, or at best 
inherits a potential for change derivatively from language and culture’.11 To remedy this all-
pervasive representationalism and, by implication, matter’s perceived passivity, Barad offers ‘an 
elaboration of performativity—a materialist, naturalist, and posthumanist elaboration—that 
allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming’.12 This is an interesting 
claim because even though Barad is adamant that matter and meaning are inseparable—in 
fact, she coins the term ‘intra-active’ to stress this inseparability—there is a sense in which her 
emphasis on matter as active and agentic implicitly evokes the existence of some/thing that is 
extra-discursive and has an extra-discursive drive. In fact, the contradictory notion of matter 
as an active yet neglected and ignored participant in its own becoming—which is not only 
present in the work of Barad, as I discuss in due course—forms another common point of 
critique rehearsed in much work that aims to rethink materiality.
The turn to agentic (non-human) matter as well as the expressed desire to avoid 
representationalism is linked to the idea that there has been an excessive focus on 
discourse and language to the detriment of materiality. So much so that postmoderns and 
poststructuralists, and others otherwise concerned with the discursive and linguistic, have 
allegedly forgotten about, ignored and even rejected matereality. Diana Coole and Samantha 
Frost describe this as an ‘allergy to “the real”’, while Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman clarify 
this dismissal of reality as a direct consequence of the so-called postmodern belief that reality 
is constituted by language.13 The latter editors write in the introduction to their anthology 
Material Feminisms that ‘postmodernists argue that the real/material is entirely constituted by 
language; what we call the real is a product of language and has its reality only in language’.14 
Here, then, we find another commonly expressed assumption about postmodernists and the 
like, namely, the idea that they reject reality. A discussion of this perceived anti-realism offers 
an interesting starting point for an examination of the ways in which postmodernism and 
poststructuralism are understood in much work that aims to contribute to current debates on 
8 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter’, 
Signs: Journal of Woman in Culture and Society’, vol. 28, no. 3, 2003, p. 801, emphasis added.
9 Ibid., p. 804.
10 Ibid., pp. 804, 806, emphasis added.
11 Ibid., p. 801.
12 Ibid., p. 803.
13 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, ‘Introducing the New Materialism’, in New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics, ed. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2010, p. 6.
14 Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, ‘Introduction: Emerging Models of Materiality in Feminist Theory’, 
in Material Feminisms, ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 
2008, p. 2.
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the matter of materiality. I turn, then, to Hekman who explicitly refers to this alleged anti-
realism in her single-authored monograph The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures.
III
Hekman’s book is structured around three theses. She argues that there is a growing 
dissatisfaction with what she refers to as linguistic constructionism; that feminists are at the 
forefront of the intellectual project that moves away from this linguisticism; and, that these 
new ways of thinking need to find a way ‘to bring the material back in’.15 She further clarifies 
her goals by positing that feminists ‘have a particular stake in retaining reference to reality. 
They want to be able to make statements about reality’, which, according to Hekman, entails 
‘that woman are oppressed; that their social, economic, and political status is inferior to men; 
that they suffer sexual abuse at the hands of men’, and, most importantly, Hekman writes, ‘if 
everything is a linguistic constructionism, then these claims lose their meaning’.16 Let me be 
clear here, I do not aim to dispute the ongoing oppression of or discrimination against women. 
However, what I find profoundly disturbing about Hekman’s claims is the underlying idea that 
there is a reality other than the one we refer to when we make statements about the world and 
the notion that the linguistic turn has caused this alleged dismissal of reality.
By referencing Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Hekman elucidates 
her position. She contends that Kuhn’s ‘argument that the scientists’ concepts create the 
reality that they study seemed, to at least some philosophers of science, irrefutable. It 
generated a movement among philosophers of science characterized by the embrace of 
linguistic constructionism at the expense of reality.’17 Elsewhere in her book, she specifically 
links this way of thinking—that apparently takes place at the expense of reality—to 
postmodernism and poststructuralism, which ‘are identified with the foundation of linguistic 
constructionism: the thesis that there is nothing but discourse’.18 Hekman continues to 
suggest that ‘postmoderns and poststructuralists, it is assumed [although it is not clear who 
makes this assumption], have no possible bases for judgments, moral or epistemological, 
and reject the existence or even possibility of “reality”’.19 This generalisation, Hekman 
immediately acknowledges, is ‘problematic on many levels’.20 She notes, ‘there is the issue 
of who is a “postmodern” or “poststructuralist” and what, if any, differences separate the two 
positions’, moreover, she goes on to ask, ‘is there a set of common themes that characterize 
all the theorists placed under these labels?’21 Notwithstanding my appreciation for Hekman’s 
critical position towards her own claims, as well as her use of the terms postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, the most important aspect of her argument—that is, how she understands 
the postmodern rejection of reality—is left out of this questioning. Now, the difficulty 
15 Susan Hekman, The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
IN, 2010, p. 2.
16 Ibid., p. 3, emphasis added.
17 Ibid., p. 11, emphasis added.
18 Ibid., p. 47. Hekman’s claim is, of course, an indirect reference to Derrida whom is absent in Hekman’s 
account but present in this article.
19 Hekman, p. 47.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. For a description of these differences, albeit in a sociological context, see Ben Agger, ‘Critical 
Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 
17, 1991, pp. 105–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.17.1.105
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with responding to Hekman’s argument lies in the fact that she does not reference any 
postmodern or poststructuralist text or theorist to support her claims. For this reason, I turn 
to the logic that seemingly underlies her argument, namely, that linguistic constructionists 
think and write ‘at the expense of reality’.
It seems to me that Hekman implicitly suggests that discourse and language cover 
up and bury, as it were, a primary and untainted reality. Contrary to Hekman, however, 
I argue that scholars associated with this kind of thinking (Butler, Derrida, Haraway, 
Shildrick and Spivak, to name just a few) instead point out that even our best efforts to 
understand matereality are always-already inextricably and constitutively intertwined 
with the discourses out of which this matereality emerges. Consequently, the theoretical 
endeavours of these scholars do not set out to think reality at its own expense but, rather, 
depart from the idea that reality is, to put it in Harawayan terms, always-already and 
necessarily ‘artifactual’. For Haraway, the term artifactualism ‘means that nature for us 
is made, as both fiction and fact’, and she continues by suggesting that ‘if organisms are 
natural objects, it is crucial to remember that organisms are not born; they are made in 
world-changing technoscientific practices by particular collective actors in particular times 
and places’.22 Haraway’s observation is thus not about anti-realism, but about the ways 
in which we understand what we refer to as reality. Haraway elaborates, albeit in specific 
reference to biology:
Organisms are biological embodiments; as natural-technical entities, they are not pre-
existing plants, animals, protistes, etc., with boundaries already established and awaiting 
the right kind of instrument to note them correctly. Organisms emerge from a discursive 
process. Biology is a discourse, not the living world itself. But humans are not the only actors 
in the construction of the entities of any scientific discourse; machines (delegates that can 
produce surprises) and other partners (not ‘pre- or extra-discursive objects’, but partners) 
are active constructors of natural scientific objects. Like other scientific bodies, organisms are 
not ideological constructions. The whole point about discursive construction has been that 
it is not about ideology.23
Haraway’s passage importantly critiques the notion of pre- or extra-discursive objects (such 
as reality and matter), and, simultaneously, undermines the idea of language being merely 
representational.24 Haraway’s artifactualism, then, helps to make clear that suggesting, as 
Hekman does, that some scholars think about language and discourse ‘at the expense of 
reality’, is to evoke a notion of reality in a highly particular way, which is itself the result of a 
contextually specific discursive practice.
To give Hekman her due, it must be acknowledged that she devotes one chapter 
each to Foucault and Butler. However, she writes in these chapters, respectively, that 
‘one “postmodern” thinker, Michel Foucault, does not fit the commonly accepted profile 
of the “postmodern”’.25 Similarly, Butler, the one theorist who ‘stands for the linguistic 
constructionism that has dominated feminist theory in the last decades’ actually ‘moves 
22 Donna Haraway, ‘The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others’, in The 
Donna Haraway Reader, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 65.
23 Ibid., p. 67.
24 In fact, you could say that language is one of those machines that Haraway mentions in the passage 
above and is thus an active constructor of objects—a point that I will return to in due course.
25 Hekman, p. 48.
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beyond linguistic constructionism’.26 Hekman continues, not only ‘is [Butler] a student 
of Foucault’, she also realises ‘the limitations of a strict linguistic constructionism’.27 I 
emphasise Hekman’s contradictory engagement with these scholars because it provides 
one of the clearest examples of how new materialism’s founding gestures misrepresent the 
theorists and positions under critique. Instead of concluding that perhaps postmodernism 
and poststructuralism do not neglect the material or advocate linguistic constructionism 
‘at the expense of reality’, Hekman’s contextualisation of these scholars—who allegedly 
most clearly represent postmodernism and poststructuralism and thus the rejection of 
reality—turns them into the exception to the rule. But this rule is not discussed in either 
of these chapters. This is not surprising since no postmodern theorist, to my knowledge 
at least, has ever claimed that there is no reality. Perhaps the absence of such claims by 
postmodernists and poststructuralists constitutes the reason not many who contribute 
to the new materialist debate discuss particular theorists or texts to justify the criticisms 
that I mention in the introduction of this article. There are, however, a few texts in which 
particularly Butler’s work is singled out and examined, and it is to those readings that I 
now turn.
IV
Lena Gunnarsson’s ‘The Naturalistic Turn in Feminist Theory: A Marxist-Realist 
Contribution’ stands out from many texts that contribute to current debates on the 
matter of materiality for two reasons. Not only does Gunnarsson engage with Butler 
(albeit briefly) to ground her critique of what she terms ‘nature-phobic tendencies 
within feminist theory’, thereby refusing to blindly copy the oft-rehearsed criticism that 
postmodernists have neglected matter without providing evidence for such claims, but she 
is also critical of new materialism. Gunnarsson engages with ‘the feminist debate about 
nature and its relation to the social from a Marxist-Realist point of view’.28 In fact, she 
clarifies that ‘the realism to which [she] subscribe[s] is the critical realism first developed 
by Roy Bhaskar’ (emphasis in original), and which offers ‘a robust meta-theoretical 
basis for challenging poststructuralist tendencies towards relativism, subjectivism, cultural 
reductionism, anti-realism and anti-naturalism’.29 In an article that is concerned with 
‘new materialist’ texts like this one, a discussion of a Marxist-Realist inspired text may 
seem odd. However, Gunnarsson’s description of ‘feminist nature-phobia’, which she 
specifically links to the work of Butler, is similar to much rhetoric that underpins new 
materialist texts such as Hekman’s aforementioned book. I turn, then, to Gunnarsson’s 
discussion of these nature-phobic tendencies, which, according to her, are clearly visible in 
Butler’s work.
Gunnarsson claims, ‘although it seems rather undisputable that human societies are rooted 
in organic and non-organic natural realities, the challenge to such claims by feminist theorists 
like Judith Butler has had an enormous influence on feminist discourse’.30 She goes on to 
26 Ibid. p. 95.
27 Ibid., pp. 95, 96.
28 Lena Gunnarsson, ‘The Naturalistic Turn in Feminist Theory: A Marxist-Realist Contribution’, Feminist 
Theory, vol. 14, no. 1, 2013, p. 4, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1464700112468567
29 Ibid., pp. 4, 5, emphasis added.
30 Ibid., p. 5.
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clarify her position, now specifically drawing on the work of Bhaskar, by arguing that ‘what is 
at work in Butler’s writings and in discursive poststructuralism generally31 is … “the epistemic 
fallacy”, whereby ontological questions are understood in epistemological terms’.32 Gunnarsson 
continues her critique, noting:
Butler is right that we cannot know about sex other than through conceptual systems that are 
always culturally constructed. What I question is the way in which she derives from this 
truth the conclusion that sex does not exist beyond our conceptualisations of it. While 
Butler has sought to refute claims that she reduces biology to its enmeshment in discourse, 
her framework precludes an analysis of what effects biology might have on discourse 
and performative processes. Likewise, her appeal to ‘materiality’ (1993) is unconvincing 
to the extent that she insists on attributing to discourse the force that structures, constitutes 
and governs the material.33
On the one hand, writes Gunnarsson, we ‘cannot know about sex other than through 
conceptual systems’, yet, on the other hand, this apparently does not mean that ‘sex does 
not exist beyond our conceptualisations of it’. One way to respond to Gunnarsson’s 
questioning is to argue, as Thomas Laqueur does in his book Making Sex: Body and Gender 
from the Greeks to Freud, that the ways in which sex is known are socially, culturally and 
historically specific. He writes, ‘sex, like being human, is contextual. Attempts to isolate it 
from its discursive, socially determined milieu are as doomed to failure as the philosopher’s 
search for a truly wild child or’, as he goes on to note, ‘the modern anthropologist’s 
efforts to filter out the cultural so as to leave a residue of essential humanity’.34 Laqueur’s 
passage importantly points out that sex is not a thing in and of itself. In other words, 
that what we refer to as sex (or materiality, for that matter) is not determinably separate 
from the background against which it takes shape. What seems to structure Gunnarsson’s 
questioning, in contrast, is the implicit assumption that the thing represented in 
the ‘conceptual systems that are always culturally constructed’ is separate from its 
representation.
Gunnarsson’s implicit suggestion that (something we refer to as) sex does exist 
beyond our conceptualisation is the kind of critique that lies at the heart of Samantha 
Frost’s discussion of Butler’s writing in her article ‘Re-Considering the Turn to Biology 
in Feminist Theory’. Similar to Gunnarsson’s questioning of Butler, Frost discusses 
the ‘what about hormones?’ question Butler’s critics have posed in response to her 
performative theory of gender, and which, pace Gunnarsson’s questioning, also seems 
31 Interestingly, disputing Butler’s work is here regarded as disputing ‘discursive poststructuralism’ more 
generally, while references to this kind of poststructuralism are not given.
32 Gunnarsson, p. 5.
33 Ibid., pp. 5–6, emphasis added.
34 Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: The Body from the Greeks to Freud, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, p. 16. Note that Jeffrey Weeks argues similarly, albeit in a different context, about sexuality. 
He writes: ‘I want to stress that sexuality is shaped by social forces. And far from being the most natural 
element in social life, the most resistant to cultural moulding, it is perhaps one of the most susceptible to 
organization’, and he goes on to argue, ‘indeed I would go so far as to say that sexuality only exists through 
its social forms and social organization’ (Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality, Routledge, London, 1986, p. 24). He then 
continues, in a similar way to the reasoning that characterises the writings of Laqueur: ‘I do not wish to 
deny the importance of biology. The physiology and morphology of the body provides the preconditions for 
human sexuality. Biology conditions and limits what is possible. But it does not cause the patterns of sexual 
life’, and he then makes a crucial remark: ‘I prefer to see in biology a set of potentialities which are trans-
formed and given meaning only in social relationships’ (Weeks, p. 25).
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to imply that certain things simply cannot be discursively conceptualised into being.35 
‘These critics’, Frost writes, ‘can be seen as reversing the terms of sceptical inquiry to 
suggest that hormones and chromosomes are aspects of the sexually dimorphic biological 
body that are beyond the range of discursive materialisation’, and she goes on to clarify 
this position: ‘in other words, some elements of the body’s sex are ontologically prior 
to or outside of the discursive regime that would render bodies intelligible according to 
the matrix of heterosexuality. Those elements … cannot be doubted, deconstructed, or 
otherwise denaturalised.’36 Frost immediately, however, notes that Butler, in her response 
to these criticisms, offers ‘an absolute reassurance to [her] interlocutor’, yet, ‘some anxiety 
prevails’.37
Butler clarifies this anxiety in Bodies That Matter. She notes in the preface of this book, 
in response to critics of her earlier Gender Trouble, that ‘bodies live and die; eat and sleep; 
feel pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these “facts”, one might skeptically 
proclaim, cannot be dismissed as mere construction’, and goes on to argue that ‘surely there 
must be some kind of necessity that accompanies their primary and irrefutable experiences 
… but their irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through 
what discursive means’.38 Furthermore, Butler elucidates in the introduction:
To ‘concede’ the undeniability of ‘sex’ or its ‘materialization’ is always to concede some 
version of ‘sex’, some formation of ‘materiality’. Is the discourse in and through which that 
concession occurs—and, yes, that concession invariably does occur—not itself formative 
of the very phenomenon that it concedes? To claim that discourse is formative is not to 
claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather, it 
is to claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further 
formation of that body.39
There is, then, no anti-realism in Butler’s account. Butler does not deny the ‘body’; indeed, 
she writes, ‘the linguistic capacity to refer to sexed bodies is not denied’.40 What Butler 
does do, however, and this is fundamental to my argument in this article, is alter the very 
meaning of ‘referentiality’. That is, she argues ‘the constative claim is always to some degree 
performative’, or, in other words, she directs us to the constitutive effects of language.41
Jessica Cadwallader aptly captures this crucial alteration of the meaning of referentiality 
in her review of three books about Butler’s work. She explains ‘Butler’s reference to 
“chromosomal” and “hormonal” differences can be understood not as a concessional 
constantive [sic] claim about the body—and especially not a constantive [sic] claim about 
those elements which are not able to be performatively “recuperated” but’, Cadwallader 
makes clear, ‘as a demonstration that this claim participates in that which it allegedly only 
35 Note that this question is addressed by Butler in the preface of Bodies that Matter. See Judith Butler, 
Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, Routledge, New York, 1993, p. ix.
36 Samantha Frost, ‘Re-Considering the Turn to Biology in Feminist Theory’, Feminist Theory, vol. 15, no. 3, 
2014, p. 314, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1464700114545323
37 Butler, cited in Frost, ‘Re-Considering the Turn to Biology’, p. 314.
38 Butler, p. ix.
39 Ibid., p. 10.
40 Ibid., p. 11.
41 Ibid., p. 11.
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seeks to name, forming the body, its chromosomes, its hormones’.42 With this changed 
concept of referentiality in mind, I turn once more to Gunnarsson.43 She writes:
It is only if we concede that there is a natural dimension to social existence, and seek to 
specify its conditioning role while demonstrating that such conditioning is not the same as 
determinism, that we have reached the core of the determinist argument and challenged the 
notion that if there is nature, nature overrides everything else.44
This passage not only shows Gunnarsson does not take into account the constitutive effects 
of language, but also emphasises the importance of the way in which Butler has changed the 
meaning of referentiality. By this, I mean that every attempt at specifying ‘a natural dimension 
to social existence’ will always-already, and with no exception, be a discursive practice. Our 
specifying practices will produce some/thing that is necessarily always other-than the ‘natural 
dimension’ we seek to specify.
Now, the sceptic, new materialist or otherwise, may object here and contend I harbour a 
language/reality dichotomy. I will return to this line of thought below, but here I would like 
to mention such an objection fails to take into account, as Margrit Shildrick aptly notes, 
that ‘given the theoretical insights of deconstruction, it is no longer possible to separate 
out the abstract and the material: both are discursively produced and are equally unstable’; 
consequently, ‘it is not a matter of denying that the medium of the body has reality, but of 
affirming that there is no essential corpus upon which meaning is inscribed’.45 Given this, 
we might say Gunnarsson’s suggestion of specifying ‘a natural dimension to social existence’ 
is a fruitless endeavour as we will never be able to recover this dimension other than by 
always-already also being constitutively involved in its specification. And we might also say, 
then, Gunnarsson’s questioning of the Butlerian notion that ‘sex does not exist beyond our 
conceptualizations of it’ appears indeed to be not so questionable at all.
Frost reads Gunnarsson’s frustration with Butler’s assertion that ‘sex does not exist 
beyond our conceptualizations of it ’ differently. Frost writes that ‘perhaps what animates 
the “what about hormones?” question is not a desire to capture or hold on to some 
kind of pre- or extra-discursive realm’, but instead, she continues to suggest, ‘perhaps 
what troubles feminists in the face of the biological body is not necessarily or only its 
discursive naturalisation but also an inability to talk about the social in interaction with the 
body outside of the framework of meaning’.46 The italicised part in this last quotation is, of 
course, a necessary consequence of adopting Butler’s position, which Frost paraphrases 
as follows: ‘the grammar we have at our disposal is such that we cannot talk about 
the putative reality of biology without naturalising it. If we concede the existence of 
42 Jessica Cadwallader, ‘How Judith Butler Matters’, Australian Feminist Studies, vol. 24, no. 60, 2009, p. 
293, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08164640902852506
43 Allow me to make clear that I support Gunnarsson’s critical interrogation of some tendencies of the 
material turn, such as ‘the glorification of the dynamic and unruly’ (Gunnarsson, p. 3). I also agree with her 
argument that both the radical constructivist (which is neither the same as poststructuralist nor descriptive 
of Butler’s position) and biological determinist are characterised by ‘reductionism, insofar as that which is 
really both biological and socially constructed is reduced to a matter of either biological or social determin-
ations’ (Gunnarsson, p. 6). I disagree, however, with her implicit reasoning that sex (or any other ‘thing’) is 
extra-discursive and/or can be thought outside a framework of meaning.
44 Gunnarsson, p. 6, emphasis added.
45 Margrit Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self, Sage, London, 2002, p. 
120.
46 Frost, ‘Re-Considering the Turn to Biology’, p. 316, emphasis added.
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hormones … we thereby, through that concession, reconstitute a domain of extra-
discursive reality.’47 Yet, despite this acknowledgment it seems that Frost steadfastly 
wants to be able to think a putative reality and holds Butler accountable for hiding this 
reality behind linguistic constructions.
Frost writes, ‘even as Butler chafes against the seeming explanatory fullness of the discursive 
account of the biological body, the terms of the exchange as she retells it position what is beyond 
meaning as beyond the purview or reach of the social’, and she continues, ‘it is as if, in our 
conceptual playground, social effects can only be those constitutive of meaning’.48 My problem 
with this formulation is whether Frost is right to assert that Butler positions that what is 
‘beyond meaning’ as ‘beyond the purview of the social’. This, to me at least, seems the kind of 
positing gesture that Butler expressly avoids.49
This positing gesture is further illustrated by Frost’s assertion that what is eclipsed in 
Butler’s thinking, ‘are the interactions between the social and the biological that are not, 
or not only, linguistic or discursive’.50 Frost elucidates, ‘the point of saying so is not to 
deny that biology is discursively naturalised nor to preserve some domain of the biological 
as undetermined by the normative imperatives of the discursive regimes we inhabit’, but 
rather, ‘to remember, to grant to ourselves, and to consider what it means to say that we, 
as biological organisms, are alive’.51 Despite the fact it may seem as if the sole point of 
mentioning that we are ‘alive’—a concept that remains uninterrogated in Frost’s article—is 
precisely to emphasise the existence of that which remains beyond culture and the social, 
the extra-discursive facts of life, Frost explicitly writes that this is not the case. Rather, the 
reason she emphasises that we are alive is ‘if we can grant that we are alive, that we develop, 
grow, and die, then we also implicitly grant that living bodies grow within, and cannot 
grow without, habitats’.52
Frost makes this point, then, for which she relies on the work of Fausto-Sterling, to 
highlight a certain permeability that is inherent to our bodily being-in-the-world. She 
elaborates:
Against the notion that the body is spatially indifferent and temporally static, [Fausto-
Sterling] situates the body in (its) historical time, insisting that we conceive of the body as a 
collection of processes of growth, transformation, and dynamic re-stabilisation both within 
47 Ibid., p. 314. Note that Shildrick makes a similar observation. She writes, ‘organic bodies are as it were 
naturalized post hoc’, Shildrick, p. 11.
48 Frost, ‘Re-Considering the Turn to Biology’, p. 316, emphasis added.
49 A similar kind of positing gesture occurs in Noela Davis’s criticism of Butler’s work. She writes, ‘for 
Butler, the physical body is apparently no more than a base that we cannot know, that cannot be made 
known and that interpellative naming animates and contours with a social, and thus knowable, existence’. 
See Noela Davis, ‘New Materialism and Feminism’s Anti-Biologism: A Response to Sara Ahmed’, Euro-
pean Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, 2009, p. 78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350506808098535 
In contrast to Davis’s reading, I would like to suggest that the physical body is not turned into an unknow-
able ‘base’ in Butler’s work. It could not be because it is not an actuality as such. What Davis refers to as 
an unknowable ‘base’ is, rather, produced in and through the very articulation of Davis’s claim, which is, 
moreover, infrastructurally connected to Davis’s value-laden perceptive practices. The argument that there 
is something such as ‘a base’ completely ignores Butler’s insistence that ‘language and materiality are fully 
embedded in each other’. See Butler, cited in Margrit Shildrick with Janet Price, ‘Openings on the Body: A 
Critical Introduction’, in Feminist Theory and the Body, ed. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick, Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 1999, p. 9. 
50 Frost, ‘Re-Considering the Turn to Biology’, p. 316.
51 Ibid., emphasis added.
52 Ibid., p. 317.
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individual organisms and across generations. In arguing thus, she brings into consideration 
the various spatial and temporal scales of the permeable body’s inescapable engagement with 
its social and material environment.53
Before I continue discussing Frost’s argument, it is important to underscore here that she 
develops this part of her article in response to Butler’s work in which, according to Frost 
(and as I quoted earlier), what gets eclipsed are the ‘interactions between the social and the 
biological that are not, or not only, linguistic or discursive’.54 What I would like to stress at 
this point, then, is that my own overtly positioned discussion of Butler (and, earlier, Haraway) 
does not preclude these interactions or, at the very least, a rethinking of nature/culture that 
emphasises such reciprocity.
Butler herself suggests that such mutual shaping of biology/culture is present in her work. 
She says in interview with Vicky Kirby:
I think we can see in work such as Anne Fausto-Sterling’s, efforts to come up with 
‘interactive’ models that insist that (a) biology conditions cultural life and contributes to its 
forms, and (b) cultural life enters into the reproduction of our bodies at a biological level. My 
sense is that her formulation is resonant with my brief effort to establish a kind of chiasmic 
relation between the two. After all, she also eschews forms of determinism, either cultural or 
biological, and yet refuses the collapse of the categories into one another.55
Butler does not contest, then, the notion of a mutual shaping of nature/culture.56 What is 
particularly problematic about Frost’s claim, as I noted earlier, is that in her articulation 
of ‘interactions between the social and the biological that are not, or not only, linguistic or 
discursive’ she implicitly makes a positing gesture; that is, there is a sense in which her claim 
alludes to interactions which are extra-discursive and, problematically, self-evidently visible as 
such. Again, Butler may help us here.
In the aforementioned interview, Kirby asks Butler whether she thinks that her 
‘theorization of normative power [is] compatible with the direction of Macherey’s musings’, 
which here refer to his notion of ‘“the biological model of the norm” [that] extend[s] 
Foucault’s biopower to include a “natural history of norms”, a “force of life” that might even 
accommodate Spinoza’s substantive sense of agency’.57 I discuss this particular exchange not to 
examine Butler’s theorisation of normative power but, rather, to draw attention to the way she 
responds to the idea of ‘the biological’. Butler answers:
I am wondering whether there is, though, in what you describe a certain figure of the 
‘biological ’ that presumes that it is ‘multiple, contrary, disseminated, undecidable’. I worry 
that this imputes a certain critical or utopian power to the biological, and that history and 
science of biology is itself set aside in favour of a rather idealist construal.58
Butler’s reply is in keeping with her alteration of the meaning of referentiality because an 
‘idealist construal’ of the biological is, of course, a highly particular account of such a concept. 
53 Ibid., p. 319.
54 Ibid., p. 316.
55 Butler, cited in Vicki Kirby, Judith Butler: Live Theory, Continuum, London, 2006, p. 145.
56 And neither, of course, does Haraway whom I cited earlier.
57 Kirby, Judith Butler, p. 149.
58 Butler, cited in Kirby, Judith Butler, p. 149, emphasis added.
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Consequently, the question that Frost’s implicit positing gesture gives rise to is how any non-
discursive interaction between the social and the biological can be thought, approached or 
even si(gh)ted.
To be fair though, in her article Frost does not, unlike in an earlier publication, 
(problematically) suggest that ‘new materialists … conceive of matter or the body as having 
a peculiar and distinctive kind of agency, one that is neither a direct nor an incidental 
outgrowth of human intentionality but rather one with its own impetus and trajectory’.59 Yet, 
there is a sense in which her argument in this more recent piece also relies on the idea of 
an extra-discursive drive, which becomes observable in the ‘forces, processes, capacities, 
and resiliencies with which bodies, organisms, and material objects act both independently 
of and in response to discursive provocations and constraints’;60 a claim that in its very 
articulation completely disregards the inextricability of matter and meaning—a notion so 
central to much work that associates with new materialism.
In Frost’s more recent article that I have been discussing, she contends, in agreement with 
her emphasis on a mutual shaping of biology and culture:
We are amply familiar with different theories of how language, norms, psychic formations, 
or group identities shape our interactions and influence our behaviour, but we are not 
nearly as familiar with the electro-chemical signals, the hormonal or steroidal floods, the 
nervous-system adjustments, and the reflex actions that constitute our bodily response to 
and recalibration in the encounter with our lived and imagined environments.61
This contention, as I hinted at earlier, implicitly revolves around a positing gesture; that is, the 
references to changes, adjustments and actions that take place within the body are, crucially, 
referred to here as bodily responses. My aim in highlighting this is not to dispute that bodies 
respond to their environments. Rather, what I find problematic is the underlying idea that we 
can become familiar with these ‘floods’, ‘adjustments’ and ‘actions’ as though they are empirical 
certainties in and of themselves that are, to put it in Harawayan terms, waiting to be 
si(gh)ted. In other words, Frost posits the existence of things she calls hormonal and steroidal 
floods, nervous-system adjustments, and so on, instead of seeing them as performative effects. 
If Butler applied this same logic, this would mean positing selves before their performance, 
which, of course, she does not.
V
So far I have focused on the accuracy of claims about the status and role of matter, 
referentiality and representation in postmodern and poststructuralist thought. Further, one 
of the problems I have identified in new materialist work is that it often replaces a perceived 
idealism in postmodernism and poststructuralism with a highly problematic conception 
of matter as a thing in or of itself with its own identifiable agentic drives. I elaborate the 
problematic nature of this conception in due course. First, however, I want to consider what 
these gestures mean for our understanding of the genealogy of theory(ies) of the body, in 
particular, feminist theories of embodiment. There is no space in this article to do justice to 
59 Samantha Frost, ‘The Implications of the New Materialism for Feminist Epistemology’, in Feminist 
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge, ed. Heidi E. Grasswick, Springer Nether-
lands, Dordrecht, 2011, p. 70, emphasis added.
60 Ibid.
61 Frost, ‘Re-Considering the Turn to Biology’, p. 314.
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the history of scholarship in this field, but it is important to make this return, however brief 
and selective, lest we forget the body of work that, as Ahmed puts it, ‘disappears in the very 
argument that we must return to the biological’.62 Ahmed further notes that ‘by constructing 
feminism as “prohibiting” an attention to the biological and other matters, this new work 
is often represented as a gift to feminism in its very refusal to be prohibited by feminism’s 
prohibitions’.63 However, making a return to these reputed prohibitions in past feminist 
theory(ies) of the body reveals that surprisingly similar rhetorical gestures to those that 
(in)form the new materialist field have been used to prompt a rethinking of the substance 
of the corporeal.64
One only has to think of the work of a few better-known feminist theorists, such 
as Lynda Birke, Vicki Kirby and Elizabeth Wilson, to see that these gestures feature 
prominently in cultural and feminist theory’s past. In fact, all three scholars start their 
monographs from the late 1990s with a rhetorical gesture almost identical to the one found 
in much contemporary new materialist scholarship.65 It is not the case, then, as Alaimo and 
Hekman argue, that ‘it is now apparent that the move to the linguistic, particularly in its 
postmodern variant, has serious liabilities as well as advantages’.66 Rather, the per/conception 
of postmodernism and poststructuralism as indifferent to the materiality of bodily life 
has, in fact, been part of feminism since the mid 1990s, and especially made feminist 
poststructuralism a target of critique. This point is borne out by Janet Price and Margrit 
Shildrick, editors of Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader, who explicitly mention (and 
rebut) this kind of criticism in the introduction to their anthology.67
In surprisingly similar terms to those who associate with new materialism, then, 
Shildrick and Price identify a particular kind of accusation directed at postmodern and 
62 Ahmed, p. 26.
63 Ibid., p. 24.
64 Although what has also been termed ‘the affective turn’ does not fall within the remit or scope of 
this article, it is interesting to note here that a number of affect theorists have made similar rhetor-
ical gestures as those who associate with new materialism. Consider, in this regard, Clare Hemmings’s 
observation that ‘theorists of affect argue that constructivist models leave out the residue or excess that 
is not socially produced, and that constitutes the very fabric of our being’. See Clare Hemmings, ‘Invok-
ing Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn’, Cultural Studies, vol. 19, no. 5, 2005, pp. 548–67. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09502380500365473 For other critical interrogations of the turn to affect and its 
rhetorical  gestures, see Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard, ‘Biology’s Gift: Interrogating the Turn 
to Affect’, Body & Society, vol. 16, no. 1, 2010, pp. 29–56, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1357034X09355231, and 
Ruth Leys, ‘The Turn to Affect: A Critique’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 3, 2011, pp. 434–72, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1086/659353
65 Vicki Kirby writes, for example, ‘I am critical of an empiricism that perceives data as the raw and 
unmediated nature of the world. However, I am just as critical of postmodern correctives that regard the 
apparent evidence of nature as the actual representation of culture.’ See Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Sub-
stance of the Corporeal, Routledge, New York, 1997. Lynda Birke remarks that while ‘recent sociological 
and feminist theory has made enormously important claims about the processes of cultural inscription on 
the body, and about the cultural inscriptions of the body, the body that appears in this new theory seems to 
be disembodied’, and she continues to make clear, ‘within theory devoted to “the body”, there is remarkably 
little that enters within and considers “the body” in terms of its own inner processes’. See Lynda Birke, 
Feminism and the Biological Body, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1999, p. 2. Elizabeth Wilson 
notes that in most feminist projects ‘on “the body”, the body in question is pursued in its socially, culturally, 
experientially, or psychically constituted forms, but rarely in its physiologically, biochemically, or microbio-
logically constituted form’. See Elizabeth Wilson, Neural Geographies: Feminism and the Microstructures 
of Cognition, New York, NY, Routledge, 1998, p. 15. Wilson makes similar observations in her introduction 
to a special issue of Australian Feminist Studies that aims to further think the relation between feminist 
theory and the body. Elizabeth Wilson, ‘Introduction: Somatic Compliance—Feminism, Biology and Science’, 
Australian Feminist Studies, vol. 14, no. 29, 1999, pp. 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08164649993290
66 Alaimo and Hekman, p. 2.
67 Shildrick and Price, pp 7–10. See also Price and Shildrick, pp. 217–219.
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poststructuralist theorists. They write, ‘it is somewhat ironic that in large part the enormous 
proliferation of feminist theorisations of the body has been mobilised by the response to 
the insights of poststructuralism and postmodernism, which in their masculinist forms have 
been often accused of an indifference to materiality’.68 The editors continue, however, by 
noting:
There is no doubt that in the hands of some practitioners, the potentially endless textual play 
of many postconventional strategies has seemed to preclude any engagement with the day-
to-day lived body, or has at best emptied it out … leaving only an undifferentiated surface 
of inscription. But such an impasse … is not inevitable … to say that the body is a discursive 
construction is not to deny a substantial corpus, but to insist that our apprehension of it, our 
understanding of it, is necessarily mediated by the contexts in which we speak.69
Shildrick and Price then cite Butler’s (in)famous claim that ‘there is no reference to a pure 
body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body’, to conclude, ‘it is then 
the forms of materialisation of the body, rather than the material itself, which is the concern of 
a feminism that must ask always what purpose and whose interests do particular constructions 
serve’.70 It is impossible to do justice to the complexity and rigor of Vicki Kirby’s work in this 
article, but what is interesting to note here is her frustration with claims such as the ones made 
by Shildrick and Price.
For Kirby, the insistence that we can only apprehend and understand the body as mediated 
by the contexts in which we theorise, is ‘to think the order of the nature/culture problematic … 
by repeating the very terms that presume it’.71 I do not disagree with this particular articulation 
of Kirby’s argument, and thus, before I return to my critical interrogation of ‘the founding 
gestures of the “new materialism”’, I wish to clarify what I think is at stake in Shildrick and 
Price’s observations.
To suggest, as the editors of Feminist Theory and the Body do, that ‘our apprehension 
of [the body], our understanding of [the body], is necessarily mediated by the contexts 
in which we speak’ is not to choose the side of culture or to reduce everything to what 
Kirby terms ‘a culturalist determination’.72 Rather, it is to acknowledge that the body 
at the heart of our theorising is fundamentally somatechnical.73 For me, the neologism 
somatechnics refers to the idea that any attempt to apprehend, approach and understand 
the body (soma) takes place not only through a technologising gesture (technics), but 
after the mutual somatisation of technology and technologisation of soma—or, to put it 
in new materialist terms, the intra-action of matter/meaning—has already taken place. 
It is not the case, then, that our apprehension of and/or approach to the body is the 
moment a particular somatechnologisation articulates itself, but rather is the articulation 
of the impurity of both soma and technics within this moment. It is for this reason, then, 
that I am persuaded by Shildrick and Price’s suggestion that our focus should be on 
68 Shildrick and Price, p. 7.
69 Ibid., p. 7, emphasis in original.
70 Ibid., p. 7.
71 Vicki Kirby, “Human Nature’, Australian Feminist Studies, vol. 14, no. 29, 1999, p. 24. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/08164649993308
72 Kirby, ‘Human Nature’, p. 21.
73 For a concise and compelling explanation of the term somatechnics, see Nikki Sullivan, 
‘Somatechnics’, TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, vol. 1, nos 1–2, 2014, pp. 184–7. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1215/23289252-2399974
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interrogating what purpose and whose interests specific kinds of materialisations serve, 
rather than attempting to engage with the material itself. It seems, however, that the 
scholars who I have been critically interrogating in this article replace the language/matter 
dichotomy they see in postmodern and poststructuralist thought with a kind of realism 
that points to ‘the material itself ’.
Rebecca Coleman provides a clear example of this contradictory rhetoric in an article titled 
‘Inventive Feminist Theory: Representation, Materiality and Intensive Time’. She contends 
‘conceiving matter as that which is necessarily entangled with culture and acts in and of itself, 
feminist theorists have done much to complicate and break down the opposition between 
nature/biology and culture/language’.74 Furthermore, Coleman remarks, ‘in seeing only culture 
as agentic, a unidirectional relationship is set up between nature and culture, where it is culture 
that acts on nature’, and then notes, ‘if it is the case that matter is active and self-creative, 
then the relations between bodies and images are not unidirectional. Moreover, bodies and 
images are not separate entities, but are entangled or assembled together.’75 Despite Coleman’s 
assertion to see matter as always-already entangled-with or inseparable-from, or to put it in 
Harawayan terms, as ‘materio-semiotic’, there appears to be, at the same time, a theoretical 
longing for capturing and talking about matter—which as Coleman’s passages demonstrates 
is clearly conceived as imbued with its own extra-social drive, agency and liveliness—as 
somehow separate from the (sociocultural) background against which this matter is con/
perceived. Contradictorily then, matter’s inseparability from this background is not denied and 
is even emphasised, but so is its self-creative part.
Yet, this ‘self ’ is not free from cultural influence. Neither does this ‘self ’ exist as if in a 
vacuum. Coleman acknowledges this when she writes, evidently influenced by Barad’s 
scientific feminism, ‘it is not so much that representations give us access to the pre-existing 
material world, but that representations and matter intra-act to produce phenomena’, and 
she continues to explain, ‘that phenomena are “intra-actions”, then, refers to their necessarily 
relational nature, where relations do not exist between pre-existing things but produce and are 
part of them’.76 I do not disagree with this reading of Barad or the claims in this last passage, 
but what bothers me is that despite the awareness of this undeniable inextricability, Coleman 
(like Frost) keeps suggesting that matter acts, which presumes a kind of knowledge of matter 
and its effects as somehow clearly separately identifiable as such in the phenomenon that this 
intra-action can be said to produce.
Here, then, it seems appropriate to briefly, and somewhat simplistically, discuss the 
poststructuralist critique of self-presence in response to such problematic articulations about 
matter. It seems that the authors whose work I have been critically engaging consistently refer 
to a signified that can never be recuperated; that is, a trace of that which is evoked as ‘matter’. 
Derrida’s elucidation of this concept is helpful. He writes:
We must allow the trace of whatever goes beyond the truth of Being to appear/disappear 
in its fully rigorous way. It is a trace of something that can never present itself; it is itself 
a trace that can never be presented, that is, can never appear and manifest itself as such in 
its phenomenon. It is a trace that lies beyond what profoundly ties fundamental ontology 
74 Rebecca Coleman, ‘Inventive Feminist Theory: Representation, Materiality and Intensive Time’, 
Women: A Cultural Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 2014, p. 28, emphasis added. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09574042.
2014.901098
75 Ibid., p. 35, emphasis added.
76 Ibid., p. 38.
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to phenomenology. Like différance, the trace is never presented as such. In presenting itself 
it becomes effaced; in being sounded it dies away, like the writing of the a, inscribing its 
pyramid in différance.77
Following Derrida, we can say that the concept of matter carries with it, always-already, the 
mark of a trace of other concepts, other processes of relation and difference, other traces. And 
thus, crucially, the concept of the trace helps elucidate that where we expect to find whatever 
it is that is signified (in this case matter), we are time and again (re)directed to a trace of that 
signified (necessarily temporally differed and spatially deferred). What is more, ‘the trace is never 
presented as such’ or, putting the point differently, Derrida notes that ‘whoever believes that one 
tracks down some thing; one tracks down tracks’.78 Consequently, despite the fact that we may 
expect matter, nature and/or substance to precede its trace, we can only ever find its trace.
The scope of this article does not allow me to go into a detailed discussion of Barad’s 
theoretical framework, but in light of Derrida’s critique of self-presence it is interesting to turn 
to Coleman’s description of a Baradian scientific apparatus. Coleman writes:
Barad develops her problematization of representational thinking via a detailed account 
of the scientific apparatus through which reality is observed and measured in quantum 
physics. Drawing on the work of Niels Bohr, and arguing against an understanding of 
observational and measuring tools as neutral and objective, Barad argues that scientific 
apparatuses do not reflect reality, nor mediate between matter and scientists, but are in fact 
an integral part of the reality they seek to understand; the nature of reality depends on the 
technologies through which that reality is observed and measured.79
It seems to me that Derrida’s notion of the trace and Barad’s elaboration of Bohr point to 
a similar process at the heart of producing meaning, as well as a concomitant inevitable 
ontological instability of the meanings produced. Consequently, instead of foreclosing an 
investigation into the proximity of these positions—and such a foreclosure is performed by 
the repetition of the claim that poststructuralism and postmodernism neglect matter—the 
juxtaposition above demonstrates that their proximity should be further explored by those who 
associate with new materialism.
What I hope my discussion in this article illustrates is that ‘the founding gestures of the 
“new materialism”’ appear to be questionable at the very least. If these gestures are premised on 
the conceptual separation, or idealist construal, of matter as a thing that is somehow separate 
from the background against which it emerges, then this seemingly contradicts the argument 
that initially inspired new materialism’s re-thinking of the materiality of the body, matter and 
nature. More importantly, an engagement with postmodern/poststructuralist approaches to the 
matter of materiality, as I have demonstrated, shows a similarity to new materialism that the 
latter movement too quickly dismisses in the repetition of its founding gestures. If, as Rosalyn 
Diprose notes, there is an ‘impossibility of separating bodies from how they are known’,80 then, 
I urge scholars who associate with new materialism to trace the ways this impossibility has 
been theorised in, as well as (in)formed, cultural theory’s past.
77 Jacques Derrida, ‘Différance’ [1968], in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael 
Ryan, 2nd edition, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, 2004, p. 294.
78 Ibid. p. 296.
79 Coleman, p. 35.
80 Roselyn Diprose, ‘A “Genetics” That Makes Sense: Take Two’, in Ethics of the Body: Postconventional 
Challenges, ed. Margrit Shildrick and Roxanne Mykitiuk, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005, p. 254.
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